ADDRESS TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF RES. 1441
COLIN L. POWELL, 10:30 A.M. EST, 2003.2.5
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
2. Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.
3. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
4. Resolution 1441 ge Iraq one last chance, one last chance to e into pliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not ply.
5. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
6. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to ply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
7. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to he e to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it."
8. And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that he been outstanding since 1998."
9. My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
10. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.
11. The material I will present to you es from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who he risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
12. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when bined with what all of us he learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behior. The facts and Iraqis' behior, Iraq's behior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime he made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international munity.
13. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.
14. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. (The tape is played.)
15. Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.
16. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is ing, and they know what he's ing for and they know he's ing the next day. He's ing to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.
17. But they're worried. We he this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not he, something that should not be seen.
18. The general was incredulous: (tape )
"You didn't get it modified. You don't he one of those, do you?" "I he one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi pany." "What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll e to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all he something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't he anything left."
19. Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will e to you tomorrow."
20. The Al-Kindi pany. This is a pany that is well known to he been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.
1. 鲍威尔国务卿：谢谢你，主席先生。主席先生和秘书长先生，尊敬的同事们，首先我对各位今天专门到这里来表示感谢。今天是我们审议伊拉克局势和它履行联合国安理会第1441号决议规定的解除武器义务情况的重要一天。
2. 去年11月8日，联合国安理会一致投票通过第1441号决议。决议的目的是解除伊拉克的大规模毁灭性武器。此前，伊拉克已经被确定实质性地违反了12年来的16项联合国决议所规定的义务。
3. 第1441号决议针对的不是一个无辜的政权，而是一个被安理会多年来屡次确定违规的政权。
4. 第1441号决议给伊拉克最后一次机会，最后一次机会去履行联合国决议，否则将面临严重后果。那天在场投票的安理会成员，没有人对决议的实质和意图、或者对如果伊拉克不履行决议的“严重后果”意味着什么有任何错觉。
5. 为了协助伊拉克消除武器，我们要求伊拉克为联合国监测、核查和视察委员会(UNMOVIC)和国际原子能机构(IAEA)核查人员返回伊拉克提供合作。我们提出了要伊拉克遵守的严格标准，以便使核查人员展开工作。
6. 安理会规定，履行决议和消除武器的责任在于伊拉克，而不是靠核查人员找出伊拉克这么久以来所竭尽全力隐藏的东西。核查人员的工作是核查；他们不是侦探。
7. 我请求召开今天这个会议有两个目的。第一，支持布利克斯博士和厄尔巴拉迪博士做出的评估要点。正如布利克斯博士1月27日向安理会报告时所说，"甚至在今天，伊拉克看来仍没有真正接受对它的解除武器的要求。"
8. 也正如厄尔巴拉迪博士所报告的，伊拉克12月7日提交的报告"没有提供任何与1998年以来一直悬而未决的某些问题相关的新的信息"。
9. 我今天的第二个目的，是向你们提供更多的信息，向你们介绍美国掌握的有关伊拉克大规模毁灭性武器和伊拉克与恐怖主义的联系的情况。这也是第1441号决议和其他早期决议涉及的问题。
10. 我不妨在此补充一句，我们正在尽可能地将所有相关信息提供给武器核查小组，便于他们进行工作。
11. 我将向你们提供的材料来自许多方面。有些是美国的来源，有些来自其他国家。有些是通过技术手段，如侦听截获的电话谈话和卫星拍摄的照片。另有些是那些冒着生命危险让全世界了解萨达姆·侯赛因究竟在搞什么阴谋诡计的人。
12. 我无法向你们公布我们所掌握的全部情况，但是，一旦把我将能向你们介绍的情况与我们所有人多年来所已经了解的情况联系到一起，情况深深令人不安。你们所将看到的，是积累起来的大量事实和令人不安的行为模式。事实和伊拉克的行径表明，萨达姆·侯赛因及其政权丝毫没有 - 丝毫没有 - 按照国际社会的要求消除武器。
13. 事实上，事实和伊拉克的行径表明，萨达姆·侯赛因及其政权在隐藏其生产更多的大规模毁灭性武器的努力。
14. 让我先给你们放一段录音。你们即将听到的是我国政府监听的一段对话。对话时间是去年11月26日，也就是联合国小组恢复在伊拉克的核查工作的前一天。对话双方是伊拉克的精锐部队"共和国卫队"中的两名高级军官，一名上校和一名准将。(放录音)
15. 让我停下来重复一下你们刚刚听到的这两名军官之间对话中的一些关键内容。
16. 首先，他们提到我们的同事穆罕默德·厄尔巴拉迪要来，他们知道他要来的目的，知道他第二天到。他是来查找违禁物品的。他期待这两位先生同他合作，不藏匿物品。
17. 但是他们很担心。我们有这种经过改装的车辆。如果被他们其中一个人看见了，我们怎么说？他们担心什么？他们担心的是，这种东西是他们不应当有的，这种东西是不能被发现的。
18. 那位将军表示怀疑：(录音稿)
"你没有那种改装过的车辆。你没有那样的东西，是不是？" "我有一辆。"
"哪一辆？从哪里来的？" "从车间，从'金迪'公司。"
"什么？" "从'金迪'公司来的。"
"我早上去你那里看看。我担心你们都有些遗留的东西。"
"我们撤走了每样东西。我们没有留下任何东西。"
19. 请注意他说的话："我们撤走了每样东西。"我们没有销毁它们。我们没有把它们一一拿出来接受检查。我们没有把它们交给核查人员。我们把它们撤走了，以确保在核查人员出现时，它们不在那里。"我明天去你那里看看。"
20. "金迪"公司，这是一家众所周知的进行同违禁武器系统有关的活动的公司。
